Rysslands hanterande av sin intressesfär i Sydkaukasien

Sammendrag

Abstract: Russia’s operationalization of a sphere of interest in the South Caucasus
A central foreign policy objective of Russia is to maintain an exclusive sphere of interest in its post-Soviet neighbourhood. This article analyses how Russia employs a combination of political and military instruments in operationalizing its perceived sphere of interest in the still conflict-ridden South Caucasus. Russia is the only external power in the region to have military bases there, and is the only one seemingly ready to undertake military action. At present, Russia appears satisfied with the status quo in the South Caucasus. The unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh are therefore unlikely to be resolved in the near future. Unresolved conflicts suit Russia’s objectives. Russian military bases in Georgia and Armenia provide Moscow with both a key lever against Tbilisi and Yerevan and a structural advantage for potential Russian military operations in the region. Russia’s military posture in the Caucasus is relevant to the potential for large-scale conflict in the Southern war theatre, including the wider Middle East, and not just local conflicts in the Caucasus.